@article{oai:ncu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000729,
 author = {Sasaki, Takafumi and Yonezawa, Yasuhiro and Azeez, A.A.},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {オイコノミカ},
 month = {Nov},
 note = {We investigate how the Japanese governance characteristics hurt shareholders’ value focusing on the rent distribution problem between two residual claimant parties, shareholders and employees. We find that lower Tobin’s Q under Japanese governance characteristics is mainly attributed to the rent distribution problem, not to a decrease in productivity. We argue that pros and cons of a governance characteristic should be valued not only from the viewpoint of shareholders value but also by that of value added. In other words, corporate governance system that enhances employee-oriented management may be rational when valued from the viewpoint of value added.},
 pages = {41--64},
 title = {Japanese Corporate Governance Problem and Economic Efficiency : An Empirical Analysis of Japanese Manufacturing Firms},
 volume = {45},
 year = {2008}
}