{"created":"2023-05-15T13:16:11.932677+00:00","id":787,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"e55f5c03-713d-46a4-b696-f63a78efa688"},"_deposit":{"created_by":20,"id":"787","owners":[20],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"787"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:ncu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000787","sets":["13:7:46:89"]},"author_link":["1087","1086"],"item_10_alternative_title_2":{"attribute_name":"タイトルヨミ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"Groves-Ledyard メカニズム ニオケル Nash キンコウ ノ タッセイ カノウセイ ジッケン ケンキュウ"}]},"item_10_biblio_info_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2010-03-31","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"4","bibliographicPageEnd":"104","bibliographicPageStart":"83","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"46","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"オイコノミカ"}]}]},"item_10_description_22":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10_description_7":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本稿では，傾きを同じくする線形の公共財限界評価曲線をもつ個人を想定し，Groves-Ledyard メカニズムの下で，彼らがNash 行動（Cournot-Nash 最良反応動学）に従ってメッセージの選択を行う場合，メッセージがNash均衡に収束し，Pareto効率的配分が達成されるための条件を，罰則パラメータγの範囲として導出し，この範囲の下限γCは，Groves-Ledyard メカニズムがsupermodurality を満たすための条件としてY. Chen が示したγ の閾値γSを下回ることを明らかにした．その上で，罰則パラメータγ を，0＜γ＜γC，γC＜γ＜γSおよびγS＜γの３通りに設定した実験を実施し，どの設定においても，意思決定ラウンドの後半にはNash 行動が一般的となることを確認し，0＜γ＜γCと設定した場合にはNash 均衡へのメッセージの収束は期待できないが，γS＜γと設定した場合のみならず，γC＜γ＜γSと設定した場合においても，大部分の実験セッションでNash 均衡へのメッセージの収束が観察されるという実験結果を得た．","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10_source_id_12":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"03891364","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_10_source_id_14":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN00025971","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10_version_type_23":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"曽山, 典子"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{},{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"森, 徹"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{},{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2014-06-23"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"B41-20100301-83.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"395.3 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"B41-20100331-83","url":"https://ncu.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/787/files/B41-20100301-83.pdf"},"version_id":"bdede884-4368-40ea-98c8-895944ed1d8d"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Grove-Ledyard メカニズム","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Nash均衡","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"実験","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Groves-LedyardメカニズムにおけるNash均衡の達成可能性 : 実験研究","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Groves-LedyardメカニズムにおけるNash均衡の達成可能性 : 実験研究"},{"subitem_title":"Attainability of a Nash Equilibriumthrough Groves-Ledyard Mechanism : An Experimental Study","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10","owner":"20","path":["89"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2014-06-23"},"publish_date":"2014-06-23","publish_status":"0","recid":"787","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Groves-LedyardメカニズムにおけるNash均衡の達成可能性 : 実験研究"],"weko_creator_id":"20","weko_shared_id":20},"updated":"2023-05-15T13:59:10.136972+00:00"}